Nicole Russel... Almost But Not Quite Honest
Show Your Receipts, Nicole
Nicole Russel has written another one of her columns for USA Today, and it follows the same pattern I have documented before. She leads with moral outrage, defines opposition to administration policy as evidence of bad faith, and treats the stated humanitarian justification as beyond question. But the Venezuela operation has exposed so many contradictions that even supporters are scrambling to maintain the “liberation” narrative. The truth is this was about oil, timing, and distraction, and the administration has essentially admitted as much through its own statements and actions.
The most damning evidence comes from the administration itself. President Trump held a press conference on January 3rd where he said, verbatim, that the United States was going to “run” Venezuela and that “we want the oil industry in that country not to go to the benefit of pirates and adversaries of the United States, but for the benefit of the people” (Trump, 2026). He later added that the U.S. would “be taking a tremendous amount of wealth out of the ground.” This is not subtext. This is the text. When the Secretary of State is asked directly why the U.S. needs to take over Venezuela’s oil industry, and he responds that America does not actually need the oil but will not allow adversaries to control it, he is performing rhetorical gymnastics that do not withstand scrutiny when measured against what the president actually said at his own press conference (Rubio, 2026).
The hypocrisy here reaches heights that would make Icarus nervous. The Trump administration spent years condemning the Biden administration for allowing Chevron to operate in Venezuela under sanctions. Trump terminated Chevron’s license in February 2025, then reversed course and granted a new license in July 2025 that allowed the company to pump oil while banning proceeds from going to the Venezuelan government (Reuters, 2025; Euronews, 2025). Now, after a military operation that seized a foreign head of state, the administration is promising American oil companies access to the world’s largest proven oil reserves, 303 billion barrels worth (BBC, 2026). How does “denying adversaries control” translate to “American companies will get reimbursed” and “we’ll be selling large amounts of oil to other countries” (NBC News, 2026)?
The energy experts at Brookings Institution were direct in their assessment. Samantha Gross, who focuses on energy and climate policy, wrote that Trump’s belief that “oil revenues will fund the ongoing presence” is completely unrealistic because Venezuela’s oil infrastructure is “a shambles” (Brookings, 2026). Production has dropped from 3.2 million barrels per day in 2000 to around 860,000 barrels per day now, less than one percent of global consumption. Restoring production to peak levels would require tens of billions of dollars and potentially a decade of investment. Venezuela’s heavy, sour crude is expensive to extract and sells at a discount compared to lighter oils. The world oil market is currently well-supplied with falling prices, which narrows profit margins for expensive-to-produce crudes. “We heard this story before, when oil revenues were intended to fund the reconstruction of Iraq,” Gross wrote. “It was not true then, and it will not be true now” (Brookings, 2026).
Then there is the timing. The Democratic Oversight Committee pointed out on X that Maduro was captured on “the statutory date for the DOJ to explain its redactions in the Epstein file productions” (Democratic Oversight Committee, 2026). The DOJ was facing a deadline to explain why it had heavily redacted the newly released Epstein files, which contained numerous references to Donald Trump, including evidence that he flew on Epstein’s jet multiple times in the 1990s (Reuters, 2025; NPR, 2025). James Carville, the veteran Democratic strategist, publicly called the Venezuela operation “an Epstein distraction tactic” (Economic Times, 2026). Ro Khanna, the Democratic congressman who co-authored the Epstein Files Transparency Act, said “the most important documents are missing” from the trove of files released (NPR, 2025). Thomas Massie, the Republican congressman who led the effort to force a vote on releasing the files, said the document release “grossly fails to comply with both the spirit and the letter of the law” that Trump himself had signed (Congress.gov, 2025).
The constitutional questions about this operation are substantive, and they are being raised by experts across the political spectrum. The scholars at Brookings who analyzed this operation noted that “the operation to capture Nicolas Maduro underscores the extraordinarily broad authority that modern presidents exercise over military force, and potentially, its limits” (Brookings, 2026). The executive branch argues that the president has constitutional authority to use military force without congressional authorization so long as it supports U.S. interests and is not expected to result in “prolonged and substantial military engagements.” But when asked why congressional authorization was not needed for the Maduro operation, Secretary Rubio responded, “This was not an invasion, we did not occupy a country,” suggesting that some broader campaigns might still be beyond the president’s unilateral authority (NBC News, 2026; AP News, 2026). The 1973 War Powers Resolution imposes time limits on military engagements without congressional approval, and legislators are introducing measures that would impose further statutory constraints (U.S. Congress, 1973).
Michael O’Hanlon, a Brookings foreign policy expert with decades of defense analysis experience, captured the dilemma well: “Constitutionally, Congress should have been asked for authorization in advance of any major mission like this, not on the details of course, but on the basic concept of pursuing regime change in a foreign country through military action” (Brookings, 2026). He also noted that “international law cannot sanction the decision of one government, even ours, to use its own legal system as a basis and justification for attacking the government of another country.” Ted Piccone, another Brookings scholar with extensive experience in international law, was blunter: “Trump’s particular brand of lawless bravado, narrow-minded nationalism and crony capitalism have combined in Venezuela to lead our nation down a dark hole of open-ended responsibilities for the world’s largest holder of oil reserves” (Brookings, 2026).
Russel asks why Democrats are criticizing this operation, implying that opposition to capturing a foreign head of state through a military raid must stem from partisan animus toward Trump. But this is a deliberately impoverished framing. The questions being raised are legitimate: whether the president has constitutional authority to launch military operations against foreign governments without congressional approval, whether violating international law and the sovereignty of a Western Hemisphere nation sets a dangerous precedent, whether the administration has a coherent plan for what comes next, and whether the oil interests being served are compatible with the stated humanitarian goals. Rep. Jake Auchincloss pointed out that “Trump rejected our Constitutionally required approval process for armed conflict because the Administration knows the American people” would not support it (CNBC, 2026). Rep. Jamie Raskin called it “an unconstitutional military strike” and noted that “The Constitution does not allow the president of the United States to unilaterally launch a war to take over another country, no matter how objectionable the target” (Raskin, 2026).
The Brookings scholars who analyzed this operation were nearly unanimous in their skepticism about what comes next. Caitlin Talmadge, who specializes in military strategy and nuclear deterrence, wrote that “the U.S. intervention in Venezuela epitomizes the American way of war since 9/11: stunningly effective tactics by special operations forces, dangerously divorced from any coherent story about how they will produce strategic and political success” (Brookings, 2026). Elizabeth Saunders noted that “the Trump administration is purpose-built to enable his every whim” and that “we saw this dynamic in Iraq, where different advisers supported invading for different reasons, obscuring serious post-invasion risks” (Brookings, 2026).
What Rubio’s statements reveal, and what Russel’s column studiously avoids, is that the administration’s actual goal appears to be maintaining an “oil quarantine” that allows the U.S. to “exert tremendous leverage” over whoever remains in charge, while keeping most of the Maduro regime’s infrastructure intact (Fortune, 2026). Trump has left Maduro’s top lieutenants in place, and suggested that Venezuela’s interim president, Delcy Rodriguez, a close Maduro ally, will take orders from the U.S. This arrangement would “crush the freedom and accountability aspirations of the Venezuelan people,” as Vanda Felbab-Brown noted in her Brookings analysis (Brookings, 2026).
The “dictator” framing also ignores that the U.S. government has known exactly who Maduro is for over a decade and chose to negotiate with him when it suited American business interests. Chevron has been operating in Venezuela since 2022 under a license granted by Biden and renewed by Trump (Euronews, 2025; Reuters, 2025). The State Department under both administrations certified that Venezuela was not cooperating with counterterrorism efforts, which should have triggered sanctions termination, but the license was renewed anyway because American companies wanted access to those reserves. Now we are supposed to believe that removing Maduro by military force is about democracy and human rights when the previous administration was perfectly comfortable enriching American oil companies through a partnership with his regime?
Russel calls this operation “another military success,” and perhaps tactically it was. But military success divorced from political strategy is just organized violence, and the Brookings scholars who analyzed this operation were nearly unanimous in their skepticism about what comes next. The most honest assessment came from the administration itself, when Rubio admitted that the administration has not ruled out an occupation: “The president always retains optionality on anything and on all these matters” (Fortune, 2026). Asked if there was no plan for a U.S. occupation, Rubio “declined to rule that out” (Kyiv Post, 2026).
So what is this about? The evidence points to a combination of factors: American oil interests seeing an opportunity to access the world’s largest reserves, an administration willing to use military force to achieve geopolitical objectives regardless of legal constraints, and a timing coincidence with the release of damaging Epstein-related documents that the administration has been accused of heavily redacting. The “dictator” rhetoric serves to delegitimize opposition to these objectives, but it does not withstand scrutiny when measured against the administration’s own statements and actions.
Russel writes that “Democrats’ hypocrisy” is “remarkable,” but what is actually remarkable is how easily she is willing to accept an operation that captures foreign heads of state, promises access to oil reserves, and coincidentally occurs on the day the DOJ is forced to explain its Epstein file redactions as purely humanitarian in motivation. The receipts do not support her framing, and anyone willing to examine the evidence will see that.
If you’ve got a strong stomach read her crap here: https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/columnist/2026/01/05/democrats-criticize-trump-capture-maduro-venezuela/88017748007/
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References
Associated Press. (2026, January 4). Rubio says US won’t govern Venezuela but will press oil quarantine. https://apnews.com/live/us-venezuela-trump-maduro-updates-01-04-2026
BBC News. (2026, January 4). Trump wants Venezuela’s oil: Will his plan work? https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/crkr4y717k7o
Brookings Institution. (2026, January 5). Making sense of the US military operation in Venezuela. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/making-sense-of-the-us-military-operation-in-venezuela/
CNBC. (2026, January 3). Trump’s removal of Maduro prompts questions from Congress. https://www.cnbc.com/2026/01/03/trumps-maduro-venezuela-congress.html
Congress.gov. (2025). Epstein Files Transparency Act. https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/
Democratic Oversight Committee. (2026, January 3). [Statement on Maduro capture date and Epstein files redactions]. X. https://x.com/oversightdems
Dow Jones and Company. (2026, January 4). Rubio says the U.S. doesn’t need Venezuelan oil but seeks to deny adversaries control over it, and doesn’t rule out occupying the country. Fortune. https://fortune.com/2026/01/04/marco-rubio-venezuelan-oil-us-adversaries-control-trump-occupation-troops/
Economic Times. (2026, January). James Carville slams Trump’s Venezuela strike as Epstein distraction tactic. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/us/news/james-carville-slams-trumps-venezuela-strike-as-epstein-distraction-tactic/articleshow/126342975.cms
Euronews. (2025, December 29). Explainer: Why Chevron operates in Venezuela despite US sanctions. https://www.euronews.com/business/2025/12/29/explainer-why-chevron-still-operates-in-venezuela-despite-us-sanctions
Kyiv Post. (2026, January 4). Rubio casts Venezuela move as warning to Russia, Iran, China. https://www.kyivpost.com/post/67401
NBC News. (2026, January 4). Meet the Press with Kristen Welker: Secretary of State Marco Rubio interview. https://www.nbcnews.com
NBC News. (2026, January 5). Trump says U.S. may reimburse oil companies if they invest in Venezuela. https://www.nbcnews.com/business/energy/trump-venezuela-oil-companies-reimburse-rcna252434
NPR. (2025, December 23). Justice Department releases more Epstein files and some Trump mentioned. https://www.npr.org/2025/12/23/nx-s1-5653302/more-epstein-files-released-trump-mentioned
Raskin, J. (2026, January 3). Statement on Trump’s unconstitutional military strike on Venezuela. https://raskin.house.gov/2026/1/raskin-statement-on-trump-s-unconstitutional-military-strike-on-venezuela
Reuters. (2025, December 23). US Justice Department releases new tranche of Epstein files. https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-justice-department-releases-new-tranche-epstein-files-2025-12-23/
Reuters. (2025, July 30). Chevron granted restricted US license to operate in Venezuela, sources say. https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/chevron-granted-restricted-us-license-operate-venezuela-sources-say-2025-07-30/
Rubio, M. (2026, January 4). Interview on Meet the Press with Kristen Welker. NBC News.
Trump, D. (2026, January 3). Press conference statements on Venezuela operation. Mar-a-Lago, Palm Beach, FL.
U.S. War Powers Resolution of 1973, 50 U.S.C. sections 1541-1548.