What The Hill Doesn't Want You to Know About Venezuela
Why Keith Naughton Thinks We Can't Recognize Regime Change When It Captures Presidents on Live Television
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Call It What It Is: Regime Change Is Still Regime Change
Keith Naughton’s recent defense of the Trump administration’s Venezuela policy attempts to reframe what is fundamentally a regime change operation as something else entirely. The rhetorical gymnastics on display are impressive, but they don’t survive contact with basic definitions or the historical record.
The core premise of Naughton’s argument—that this isn’t regime change because the administration says it isn’t—doesn’t pass the laugh test. When a foreign power captures a sitting head of state, installs an interim government led by a Maduro loyalist, and announces plans to “run” the country, we’re not dealing with “pressure” or “negotiation.” We’re witnessing regime change in real-time, wrapped in the thinnest possible linguistic veils. Language doesn’t change substance. Calling it something else doesn’t make it something else.
The Afghanistan Myth: Trump’s Timeline, Biden’s Execution
Naughton repeats a common conservative talking point that Biden’s Afghanistan withdrawal was some departure from Trump’s policy. The record shows otherwise with uncomfortable clarity. On February 29, 2020, the Trump administration signed an agreement with the Taliban that set a hard deadline of May 1, 2021, for complete U.S. withdrawal (FactCheck.org, 2021). The agreement freed 5,000 Taliban prisoners, excluded the Afghan government from negotiations, and drew down U.S. forces from approximately 13,000 to 2,500.
When Biden announced he would extend the deadline to September 11, 2021, Trump criticized him for not moving faster. “I started the process,” Trump boasted at a June 2021 rally. “All the troops are coming home” (FactCheck.org, 2021).
The Doha Agreement wasn’t a framework for negotiation. It was a capitulation with a timeline attached. Biden executed the withdrawal. The timeline was Trump’s. The venue was Trump’s. The terms were Trump’s. Claiming Biden “failed” to implement a plan he found already baked into reality requires either ignorance of the facts or deliberate misrepresentation. Neither reflects well on the argument.
The Guaido Precedent: Principled Or Pragmatic?
Here’s where Naughton’s argument gets particularly thin. In 2019, the Trump administration recognized Juan Guaido as the legitimate interim president of Venezuela, declaring Maduro “illegitimate” and the National Assembly “the only legitimate branch of government duly elected by the Venezuelan people” (The White House Archives, 2019). That was a clear, deliberate act of regime change advocacy, an attempt to remove a sitting head of state and replace him with an opposition figure.
Now, years later, when a similar operation has apparently occurred, Naughton argues this isn’t regime change. The inconsistency is either intentional, or it reveals that the 2019 recognition was never about democracy. It was about leverage. The administration supported Guaido when it was politically useful and abandoned that position when other arrangements proved more convenient. That might be pragmatic realpolitik, but it doesn’t make for a coherent principle.
The Drug War Paradox: Inconsistent Priorities
Naughton praises the operation partly on drug enforcement grounds. There’s an obvious problem here: this administration’s record on drug criminals is, to put it generously, complicated.
In July 2019, Trump issued full pardons to five individuals convicted on drug trafficking charges, including Roy Wayne McKeever (using a telephone to distribute marijuana) and Michael Tedesco (drug trafficking and fraud) (Reuters, 2019). The administration also commuted the sentence of Ronen Nahmani, convicted of possession of synthetic cannabinoids with intent to distribute. These weren’t minor offenders. These were federal drug trafficking convictions.
The contradiction is stark. On one hand, the administration conducts military operations targeting alleged drug traffickers abroad. On the other hand, it pardons domestic drug traffickers. If the drug war is the justification for intervention, someone should explain why drug traffickers who’ve already been convicted and sentenced in American courts deserved executive clemency. The “drugs” framing reads more like post-hoc rationalization than genuine policy principle.
What Exactly Was “Won”? Promises vs. Outcomes
Naughton declares this a “win” for Trump. Let’s examine what was supposedly won. The administration claims concessions from Venezuela, including potential elections, humanitarian arrangements, and cooperation on drug enforcement. These are claims about future behavior from a government whose leadership has just been captured by a foreign power. The same government that has spent years defying international pressure, suppressing opposition, and maintaining power through fraudulent elections (Harrison et al., 2024).
History offers reasons for skepticism. Maduro has survived years of sanctions, international isolation, economic collapse, and diplomatic pressure. The idea that removing him by force suddenly transforms his regime’s behavior into compliance requires substantial evidence we don’t have. Promises extracted from a government in disarray are not the same as achieved policy outcomes. Until the concessions materialize, until we have verified, on-the-ground evidence, we’re dealing with aspirations, not accomplishments.
The Constitutional Question No One Is Asking
There’s also the small matter of constitutional authority. The capture of a foreign head of state and installation of an interim government without congressional authorization raises serious questions about executive power. These aren’t concerns about policy success or failure. They are questions about constitutional process that deserve answers regardless of one’s views on the underlying operation. Naughton’s article doesn’t address them, which is notable.
Honest Assessment Needed
None of this means the outcome in Venezuela is necessarily bad for the Venezuelan people, American interests, or regional stability. The analysis is simply too incomplete to reach those conclusions. What we can say is that the administration’s defenders are doing a poor job of making the case.
Regime change is regime change regardless of what PR firms call it. The Afghanistan withdrawal was Trump’s timeline. The Guaido recognition established a precedent now apparently abandoned. The drug war rhetoric doesn’t match the clemency record. The jury is still out on whether any meaningful concessions have been secured. And declaring victory before the outcomes are realized is a habit that has produced disappointments before.
What we need is honest assessment rather than triumphalist spin. The Venezuelan situation is complex enough without defenders pretending complexity doesn’t exist.
Read Naughton’s uninformed rubbish at: https://thehill.com/opinion/white-house/5677585-venezuela-trump-maduro-polls/
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## References
FactCheck.org. (2021, August 17). *Timeline of U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan*. https://www.factcheck.org/2021/08/timeline-of-u-s-withdrawal-from-afghanistan/
Harrison, C., Gerbaud, G., & Robertson, K. (2024, August 19). *How have international leaders responded to Venezuela’s 2024 election?* Americas Society/Council of the Americas. https://www.as-coa.org/articles/how-have-international-leaders-responded-venezuelas-2024-election
Reuters. (2019, July 30). *Trump issues full pardons for five convicted criminals*. https://www.reuters.com/article/legal/trump-issues-full-pardons-for-five-convicted-criminals-idUSKCN1UO203/
The White House Archives. (2019, January 23). *Statement from President Donald J. Trump recognizing Venezuelan National Assembly President Juan Guaido as the Interim President of Venezuela*. https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-donald-j-trump-recognizing-venezuelan-national-assembly-president-juan-guaido-interim-president-venezuela/